TERMINAL EVALUATION

Project ID:	4641
Project Name:	Disposal of POPs and Obsolete Pesticides and Strengthening Sound Pesticide Management
Countr(ies):	Cameroon
Implementing Agency:	FAO

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. Overview

A. Description

Project name
Disposal of POPs and Obsolete Pesticides and Strengthening Sound Pesticide Management

Country
Cameroon

GEF ID	Implementing Agency
4641	FAO

Executing Entity
Ministries of Agriculture, Environment and Public health

Trust Fund	Project Type
GET	FSP

Objective
: To reduce POPs releases from obsolete pesticide stockpiles and contaminated sites and strengthen the capacity for the sound management of pesticides.

B. Key Dates

CEO Endorsement/Approval	Agency Approval
9/24/2014	12/1/2014
Implementation Start	First Disbursement
3/1/2015	3/19/2015
Expected MTR	MTR Submission
	11/3/2025
Actual MTR	Expected Completion
6/1/2018	12/31/2023
Actual Completion	Actual TE
8/4/2025	1/11/2024
TE Submission	Final Disbursement
11/3/2025	

C. Disbursements

Project Financing	Cumulative Disbursement
1,881,000.00	1,709,230.00

II. PROGRESS STATUS AND ISSUES

A. Main Terminal Evaluation Findings

Executive summary

Introduction

1. This terminal evaluation, conducted for purposes of accountability and learning, concerns project GCP/CMR/031/GFF, funded by the Global Environment Facility (GEF) and implemented by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), in partnership with the Government of Cameroon, from 1 March 2015 to 31 December 2023. The project aimed to reduce releases of persistent organic pollutants (POPs) from obsolete pesticide stockpiles and contaminated sites, and to strengthen capacities for the sound management of pesticides. This terminal evaluation report provides GEF, FAO, the Government of Cameroon, and other stakeholders and interested parties with information on the project's outcomes and lessons learned, which they may use to inform future decisions regarding the consolidation of achievements, support for sustainability and impact, and design and implementation of similar future projects.

2. The terminal evaluation was managed and conducted by the FAO Office of Evaluation and covered the entire implementation period, as well as all project components, intervention areas and stakeholders. It was guided by three main evaluation questions (EQs): (EQ 1) To what extent did the project effectively contribute to reducing POPs releases from obsolete pesticide stocks and contaminated sites in Cameroon, and to strengthening national capacities for sound and sustainable pesticide management? (EQ 2) What factors positively or negatively affected the project's performance? (EQ 3) What good practices applied, opportunities seized or missed, and lessons learned from the project should be capitalized on in the design and implementation of future interventions, from a sustainability and impact perspective? These main questions were broken down into subquestions structured around the GEF evaluation criteria.

3. The evaluation design was non-experimental, and the methodology, primarily qualitative, was based on the theory of change (TOC) approach. The document review generated information that was subsequently used to clarify the project's TOC, develop the evaluation matrix, and guide the sampling of sites and informants. In total, 17 sites were visited out of the 33 that hosted project activities. Data collection was carried out primarily through faceto-face interviews with key informants during the field mission and, in exceptional cases, virtually with others. Data analysis was conducted in a way that generated information and evidence to inform or support the findings related to the evaluation criteria or subquestions. Based on the findings and the level of achievement of expected outcomes and target indicators, a rating was assigned to each evaluation criterion, as required by the GEF. The findings then served to formulate and support the evaluation's conclusions.

Main findings

Relevance

Finding 1. The project was well aligned with Cameroon's strategic sustainable development priorities for the horizon 2035.

Finding 2. The project was strongly aligned with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), international conventions, and the priorities of FAO and GEF. xi

Finding 3. The project addressed one of the major environmental and public health issues in Cameroon. Its objectives remain relevant, and the needs are still immense.1

Coherence

Finding 4. The project followed a previous initiative (the CleanFarms project funded and implemented by CropLife International) which secured 44.9 tonnes of obsolete pesticides and POPs in a central warehouse in 2013. But its TOC, although coherent, did not sufficiently take into account the risks related to the failure to respect the sequence and timing of planned activities, the project's limited capacity to diligently manage certain activities under the sovereign authority of the State (such as law revision), and finally the institutional context marked by administrative delays and difficulties in collaboration between several institutions.

Finding 5. The project failed to capitalize on certain proven approaches (such as the Farmer Field School [FFS]) or emerging ones (such as the Participatory Guarantee System [PGS]) that could have enhanced its impact potential. Yet, PGS are currently being piloted by stakeholders along agricultural value chains in Cameroon, and the government has initiated consultations to recognize PGS as a certification system for animal production and to incorporate it into the draft law on organic agriculture under preparation in the country. Some of the project's intervention strategies and activities also lacked the capacity to sustainably address the priority needs for health and environmental protection, while others, focused on finding concrete solutions, were overly ambitious given the time frame and the well-known operational and structural constraints in the context. For example, priority was given solely to “the elimination of the available stock of obsolete pesticides through export and destruction abroad”, which is merely a palliative solution. The action research approach proposed to develop alternatives to highly hazardous pesticides also has little chance of producing the desired impact on beneficiaries, given the short duration of the project.

Effectiveness, additionality and progress towards impact

Finding 6. The project inventoried an additional 47.6 tonnes of obsolete pesticides, bringing the total amount of obsolete pesticides available in Cameroon to 92.7 tonnes. However, due to budgetary constraints, only 35.7 tonnes were disposed of, representing a completion rate of 38 percent compared to the target.

Finding 7. The project did carry out a detailed environmental assessment of two polluted sites considered priorities among the 11 identified, but it failed to rehabilitate them due to the reallocation by the Project Steering Committee (PSC) of the funds originally planned for this purpose to the activity of disposing of obsolete pesticides. The Committee judged that the option of excavating the polluted area for treatment or disposal abroad would be too costly compared to the available budget and did not explore other decontamination methods. However, the polluted site in Dschang, contaminated with endosulfan and dichlorodiphenyldichloroethylene (DDT), is used by visually impaired people for farming and livestock, while the site in Lagdo, contaminated by unknown chemicals, is now polluted by obsolete chemical pesticides following the deterioration of the roof of a storage warehouse.

Finding 8. The project designed and implemented two microprojects for the management of empty pesticide containers at two sites, which generated interest and engagement from the targeted actors and farmers during the operation period. However, the adoption of good practices 1 As specified in sections 1.2.2 and 1.2.3 related to the context, the problems are numerous and the needs immense, while the response approaches are very often fragmented and the achievements poorly consolidated and scaled up. xii and the proposed management model remained very limited, for several reasons including limited access to water in the northern part of the country; poor understanding/application of the triple rinsing concept; significant shortcomings in the logistics of collection, storage, shredding, transport and recycling of empty pesticide containers (EPCs); the buyback price of EPC from producers considered low compared to the resale price on the market; the short duration of the collection activity; the absence of coercive tools to encourage positive behaviour and attitude changes; and the cessation of the activity without any “exit strategy”.

Finding 9. The project developed a relevant national strategy for the management of empty pesticide containers, accompanied by an action plan that was validated by the stakeholder. However, it was not approved by the partners (FAO and the Government of Cameroon) for publication and implementation by all stakeholders.

Finding 10. The project revised the existing regulatory texts to cover the entire life cycle of pesticides in Cameroon. However, at the time of its closure, the “improved regulations” developed under the project were still in the process of being finalized prior to their validation and adoption by the government.

Finding 11. The national capacity for registration, inspection and post-registration control of pesticides has been significantly improved with the contribution of the project. However, several links in the post-registration pesticide management chain still need to be strengthened before an effective reduction of risks to health and the environment can be expected.

Finding 12. The project evaluated the capacities of the National Laboratory for Diagnostic Analysis of Agricultural Products and Inputs (LNAD) and made concrete recommendations that received the support of the government and its partners. The implementation of some of these recommendations has significantly improved its operation and performance.

Finding 13. The project prompted the government to increase the number of pesticides approved for use on cotton and stored products, while withdrawing highly hazardous pesticides (Class Ib) and extremely hazardous pesticides (Class Ia).

Finding 14. The project successfully tested the effectiveness of powder from six aromatic plants as alternatives to extremely hazardous pesticides, including two against the maize weevil and four against banana pests, thereby opening promising prospects for further research or their registration.

Finding 15. The participatory action research implemented to promote alternatives to extremely hazardous pesticides against nematodes and the black weevil (Cosmopolites sordidus) of plantain banana did not produce the expected outcome. The reasons include several factors such as the inadequate selection or lack of involvement of certain beneficiaries and agricultural extension agents, as well as insufficient logistical resources.

Finding 16. The project strengthened national capacities for pesticide management and associated risks, and opened avenues for innovation and impact, but was unable to fully realize these due to budgetary constraints (inadequate budgeting and the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic) and questionable strategic choices. These factors did not allow for the collection and safeguarding of newly inventoried pesticides nor the effective decontamination of polluted sites.

Finding 17. Unfinished actions related to inventoried pesticides, site decontamination, the national action plan for managing EPCs, revised regulations, national capacities for post-registration inspection and control, research on biopesticides, and proven innovation approaches deserve to be integrated into the project exit strategy and implemented in the short term to consolidate achievements, support progress towards impact, and ensure sustainability. xiii

Efficiency

Finding 18. Despite an extended implementation period (eight years and ten months instead of the initially planned four years) and a major budget revision at no additional cost, the project only partially achieved the target set under its Component 1, which was nonetheless one of the priorities repeatedly emphasized by both FAO and the government. Indeed, the implementing and executing partners of the project were unable to effectively and promptly manage the project's design flaws, delays in the recruitment of consultants and procurement processes, the project's budget shortfall, the constraints imposed by the COVID-19 pandemic, and other operational challenges.

Sustainability

Finding 19. Financial risks related to difficulties in mobilizing government resources, and institutional risks stemming from challenges in establishing and operationalizing interministerial and public–private partnerships for the cause, exist and are likely to significantly hinder the consolidation of outcomes and their sustainability. These significant risks should be addressed and managed immediately by FAO and the government.

Implementation and execution of the project

Finding 20. FAO, as the GEF implementing agency, and the executing partners generally fulfilled their respective roles, despite some shortcomings, including FAO's lack of anticipation regarding certain internal procedures known to be complex and time-consuming, and its agreement with the PSC's decision to reallocate the funds intended for the decontamination of polluted sites in Dschang and Lagdo to another activity. Design and implementation of monitoring and evaluation

Finding 21. The implementation of the planned monitoring and evaluation plan generated information that was used for activity planning and decision-making.

Co-financing

Finding 22. The co-financing, initially estimated at USD 9 307 374 at project approval, was 90 percent achieved by project closure. However, the absence of co-financing reports made it impossible to clearly understand the processes of mobilization, utilization and valorization of these co-financing resources, or to draw lessons for future interventions.

Application of GEF policies and guidelines

Finding 23. Given its objective, the project had a strong potential positive impact on the environment and human health, but it also entailed significant risks related to the operations of inventory, packaging and export of obsolete pesticides, the environmental assessment of contaminated sites and the management of empty pesticide containers. These risks were all successfully managed.

Finding 24. Although recognized in the project document, the vulnerability of women and other vulnerable groups (children, transhumant herders and visually impaired persons) to the hazards of pesticides was not adequately addressed during implementation. Efforts initiated in this regard were limited and neither consolidated nor systematically implemented.

Finding 25. Beyond its direct implementing partners, including service providers, the project consulted civil society and the private sector but did not engage them in a broad awareness-raising campaign or in a sustainable partnership with the government. xiv Knowledge management and learning

Finding 26. The project generated good practices and lessons that are well documented in the various reports. However, it remains necessary to consolidate them into a single document and disseminate them through appropriate channels and media to facilitate their adoption. Human rights and Indigenous People

Finding 27. The project did not involve any factors likely to result in discrimination or increase the vulnerability of children, women, the elderly or Indigenous Peoples. However, the opportunity was missed to develop a strategy to support vulnerable and Indigenous Peoples in addressing pesticide-related risks, or to implement concrete actions targeting these groups.

Conclusions and recommendations

Conclusions.

Conclusion 1. Despite a limited budget and some shortcomings in the project's TOC, FAO, in partnership with the government and with GEF funding, successfully targeted one of the major – yet often overlooked – issues threatening agrifood systems, public health and the environment in Cameroon, and proposed a coherent response strategy. However, integrating activities related to public–private partnership development and proven (FFS) or emerging (PGS) approaches into the project could have enhanced or increased its potential impact.

Conclusion 2. The project made progress towards the safe disposal of inventoried obsolete pesticide stocks in Cameroon, the decontamination of classified high-risk contaminated sites, the strengthening of regulatory and institutional capacities for the rational management of pesticides throughout their life cycle, and the testing and promotion of alternatives to extremely hazardous chemical pesticides. The improvement of the diagnostic capacities of the National Laboratory for the Analysis of Agricultural Products and Inputs stands out as a notable success of the project. However, most of the targets for the outcome indicators were not achieved: the newly inventoried pesticides were not retrieved and stored in a secure location; the contaminated sites of Dschang and Lagdo, whose environmental risk was confirmed through the detailed environmental assessment conducted by the project, were ultimately not decontaminated; only 35.7 tonnes of obsolete pesticides and associated waste were disposed of, out of the 92.7 tonnes inventoried; the sustainable management models for empty pesticide containers, although developed and available, have not yet been adopted – nor have the alternatives to highly hazardous chemical pesticides, which were piloted and promoted.

Conclusion 3. The sustainability of the outcomes and the project's progress towards impact are threatened by several risks, including the government's difficulty in mobilizing additional resources at very short notice to finalize or complete priority actions that have not yet been initiated or remain pending. Another significant threat concerns the limited capacity or insufficient commitment of government decision-makers to implement concrete incentive measures aimed at engaging, involving and holding the private sector more accountable in the safe and sustainable management of pesticides and associated waste in Cameroon. Indeed, aside from the positive dynamics observed in the operations of the National Laboratory for Diagnostic Analysis of Agricultural Products and Inputs, no operational strategy or concrete measures were developed to manage these risks, consolidate achievements and promote the realization and continuity of the project's benefits for the environment and the target population.

Conclusion 4. The project's supervisory, implementation and execution bodies fulfilled their roles, but were unable to effectively anticipate or address the weaknesses related to FAO's processes and xv procedures, particularly within a context further complicated by the COVID-19 pandemic. The adaptation strategies implemented (project extensions, efforts to mobilize additional funding, and revisions to activities and budget) did not yield the expected

outcomes, thereby contributing to the project's low efficiency compared to similar projects implemented during the same period. Conclusion 5. The project successfully engaged stakeholders in pursuing its environmental objective while managing significant risks associated with the activities, yet it did not adequately address the specific concerns of the most vulnerable groups, notably women, children, Bororo herders, and visually impaired persons.

Recommendations

Recommendation 1. It is strongly recommended that FAO, in the short term, supports the Government of Cameroon in mobilizing partnerships and funding to finalize the remaining priority activities. (See Conclusions 2 and 3)

Recommendation 2. To achieve sustainable pesticide management, it is imperative for the Government of Cameroon and its partners to strengthen the capacities of national and regional private sector actors involved or interested in the pesticide management chain, including obsolete pesticides and associated waste, and to hold them accountable so they can fully assume their roles in collection, treatment and recycling. To this end, FAO should engage in dialogue with the government and support its efforts to find ways to reduce the costs of managing POPs, obsolete pesticides and associated waste, and to ensure sound management of the entire pesticide life cycle, by contracting or supporting the services of national or regional service providers. (See Conclusion 3)

Recommendation 3. FAO, in partnership with the Government of Cameroon and with the support of the GEF, must, in the short term, carry out a vulnerability analysis of social and professional groups to the risks and hazards associated with chemical pesticides, as well as a capacity assessment of national stakeholders in the pesticide waste management value chain, in order to identify their specific needs and response areas. (See Conclusion 5)

Recommendation 4. Building on the interest generated among stakeholders, the outcomes achieved and the lessons learned from its implementation, FAO should, in the medium term, support the Government of Cameroon in developing a more ambitious and sufficiently robust project – or more significant interventions – to enable the elimination of all currently identified POPs and to reduce health and environmental risks associated with the use of pesticides and related waste and residues. (See Conclusion 1)

Lessons Learned

Lesson 1. Due to potential changes in the context and risks associated with design or budgeting errors, it is essential, at the time of project launch, to verify its internal coherence, particularly the relevance of the activities and the realism of the budget and implementation timelines in relation to the intended objective.

Lesson 2. To be convincing, the awareness-raising and communication strategy on the risks and hazards of pesticides, as well as on prevention or mitigation measures, must be based on concrete and factual technical and scientific data.

B. Stakeholder Engagement

Project partnerships and stakeholder engagement

Finding 25. Beyond its direct implementing partners, including service providers, the project consulted civil society and the private sector but did not engage them in a broad awareness-raising campaign or in a sustainable partnership with the government.

164. Government organizations (Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, Ministry of Environment, Nature Protection and Sustainable Development, Ministry of Public Health), non-governmental organizations (AFAIRD, CREPD, COOPHOC, CNCC), private operators (Veolia ES Field Services Ltd, Green Cross Switzerland, Pure Earth, CropLife International), and academic or research institutions (University of Ngaoundéré, CARBAP) actively participated in the implementation of the project as executing partners (as

already described in Finding 20) and strengthened their organizational capacity and/or that of the personnel involved, and/or created new opportunities.

165. The beneficiary communities of the project and some agricultural advisers benefited from activities that offered them a direct advantage, including training on the triple-rinsing method, the collection and return of empty pesticide containers to collection points, and training on alternatives to highly hazardous pesticides. However, the engagement of these stakeholders was highly unsatisfactory with regard to the testing and promotion of alternatives to chemical pesticides at the Eséka site, for the reasons already outlined in Finding 15. Holders of obsolete pesticides, as well as users or residents living near polluted sites, were left dissatisfied. Producers involved in the collection of EPCs considered the intervention period to be very short and also hoped for the continuation of the process and the associated financial compensation. Unfortunately, none of these hopes materialized.

166. The project did not sufficiently involve other relevant actors in the value chains for pesticide and associated waste management, as well as in agrifood systems. Thus, actors (producers, traders, consumers) in alternative agrifood systems were not consulted, while private sector actors specializing in the collection and recycling of used plastic packaging were only Terminal evaluation of the project “Disposal of Persistent Organic Pollutants and Obsolete Pesticides and Strengthening of the Sound Management of Pesticides in Cameroon” 50 occasionally consulted to obtain information, without genuinely exploring opportunities for improvement or capacity strengthening within the framework of a public-private partnership.

C. Gender Equality

Gender equality and vulnerable groups mainstreaming

Finding 24. Although recognized in the project document, the vulnerability of women and other vulnerable groups (children, transhumant herders and visually impaired persons) to the hazards of pesticides was not adequately addressed during implementation. Efforts initiated in this regard were limited and neither consolidated nor systematically implemented.

160. In its design, the project duly emphasized the greater vulnerability of women to the adverse effects of pesticides, as they constitute the majority of the workforce in fruit and agricultural farms as well as in production units. It is, however, surprising to note that no specific activity or indicator was integrated into the project to better address and reduce women’s vulnerability to chemical pesticides, nor their overall vulnerability across the different links of the agricultural value chains in which they play a pivotal role.

161. No gender analysis was conducted at the time of project formulation, and no study was carried out at project inception to determine the specific differences in the roles of women and men in the crop cycle in Cameroon and in the related uses of pesticides, as suggested in the project document. The specific needs were therefore neither understood nor taken into account in the training on alternatives to chemical pesticides (Component 4 of the project) or in the broader contribution to women’s empowerment in the project intervention sites. The only point of satisfaction lies in the involvement of the NGOs AFAIRD and CREPD, which ensured better representation and participation of women in awarenessraising activities on the management of EPCs. The evaluation, however, found no evidence demonstrating the strong involvement of women in promoting alternatives to hazardous pesticides.

162. Efforts were made to involve women in all project activities, but their participation remained very limited. Women were members of the project management team. A woman served as the Project Technical Coordinator, and another was the Coordinator of the NGO Association of Integral African Women for Research and Development, responsible for awareness-raising activities. Two women (civil servants from the

Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development and the Ministry of Environment, Nature Protection and Sustainable Development) completed the online postgraduate course on pesticide risk management at the University of Cape Town, South Africa. Of the 791 people trained in EPC management, with a focus on triple rinsing of containers immediately after use, 186 were Project performance 49 women. They also took part in testing the EPC collection system established at the project's pilot sites in the Littoral and North regions. Women participated in the capacity-building workshop for banana producers on alternative methods for controlling banana pests, which involved 40 farmers (12 women and 28 men), and in the demonstration workshop organized for 30 maize producers (six women and 24 men) on the production and formulation of biological alternatives to hazardous pesticides used against maize weevils.

163. No effort was made by the project to prevent and mitigate the risks associated with the misuse of chemical pesticides and empty pesticide containers among vulnerable groups such as children, transhumant herders and visually impaired persons. Children, like transhumant herders, have considerable freedom of movement in these areas and make various uses of EPCs abandoned in the environment. They use them as toys, as materials for making toys, or for storing food. Transhumant herders, for their part, are increasingly engaging in agriculture and also use pesticides without understanding the rules and associated risks. The decontamination activities for the polluted sites in Lagdo were not completed, even though, in addition to soil pollution, they pose a danger to young people attending nearby schools. The same concern applies to the polluted site in Dschang, which houses the CREFISAC, where agropastoral activities are carried out by and for visually impaired persons as a means of socioprofessional integration.

D. Knowledge Management

Knowledge management and learning

Finding 26. The project generated good practices and lessons that are well documented in the various reports. However, it remains necessary to consolidate them into a single document and disseminate them through appropriate channels and media to facilitate their adoption. 167. All implemented activities were documented in technical reports validated by FAO (see Finding 20), which present the outcomes achieved while highlighting the knowledge generated or capitalized, the constraints encountered, and the good practices and lessons learned. Several pieces of knowledge and tools generated or used within the framework of the project contributed to learning. These include the triple rinsing technique for EPCs, rapid and detailed environmental assessment methods for polluted sites, obsolete pesticide inventory techniques and the use of the FAO pesticide registration toolkit. The lessons learned from project implementation are presented in detail in section 4.

III. Core Indicators

Indicator 10 Persistent organic pollutants to air reduced

Grams of toxic equivalent gTEQ (Expected at PIF)	Grams of toxic equivalent gTEQ (Expected at CEO Endorsement)	Grams of toxic equivalent gTEQ (Achieved at MTR)	Grams of toxic equivalent gTEQ (Achieved at TE)

Indicator 10.1 Number of countries with legislation and policy implemented to control emissions of POPs to air (Use this sub-indicator in addition to Core Indicator 10 if applicable)

Number (Expected at PIF)	Number (Expected at CEO Endorsement)	Number (Achieved at MTR)	Number (Achieved at TE)

Indicator 10.2 Number of emission control technologies/practices implemented (Use this sub-indicator in addition to Core Indicator 10 if applicable)

Number (Expected at PIF)	Number (Expected at CEO Endorsement)	Number (Achieved at MTR)	Number (Achieved at TE)

IV: Co Financing

Sources of Co-financing	Name of Co-financier	Type of Co-financing	Investment Mobilized	Anticipated at CEO($)	Materialized at MTR($)	Materialized at TE($)
Recipient Country Government	Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MINADER	In-kind		4,311,212.00		5,350,212.00
Recipient Country Government	MINEPDED	In-kind		480,000.00		545,636.00
NGO	University of Ngaoundere	In-kind		1,325,000.00		91,756.00
NGO	AFAIRD)	In-kind		300,000.00		320,000.00
NGO	The Research and Education Centre for Development (CREPD)	In-kind		1,000,000.00		163,900.00
Private Sector	CropLife	Grant		1,011,843.00		
Private Sector	CropLife	In-kind		709,319.00		1,721,162.00
GEF Agency	FAO	In-kind		170,000.00		170,000.00

Total Co-financing				**9,307,374.00**	**0.00**	**1,891,162.00**

Comments

V: ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL SAFEGUARDS

Overall Project/Program Risk Classification

PIF	CEO Endorsement/Approval	MTR	TE
			High or Substantial

Measures to address identified risks and impacts

Environmental and social safeguards
Finding 23. Given its objective, the project had a strong potential positive impact on the environment and human health, but it also entailed significant risks related to the operations of inventory, packaging and export of obsolete pesticides, the environmental assessment of contaminated sites and the management of empty pesticide containers. These risks were all successfully managed.

158. The processes involved in implementing the activities contributing to project Outcome 1 and 2 posed significant risks to operators, nearby residents and the environment. To mitigate these risks, the project conducted awareness campaigns on the hazards and dangers of pesticides and empty pesticide containers, selected qualified companies, and developed and implemented an environmental and social management plan for high-risk operations. Consequently, the companies and organizations involved in the processes of inventorying, securing and disposing of obsolete pesticides and associated waste, as well as in soil decontamination, used environmentally sound methods in accordance with national and regional regulatory provisions, relevant international standards and pertinent multilateral environmental agreements. However, there is some dissatisfaction in the fact that the planned decontamination of two polluted sites were ultimately not carried out, thereby reducing the intended positive environmental impact of the project.

159. The activities contributing to Outcomes 3 and 4 of the project did not present any significant risks but were instead likely to generate potential positive effects. The strengthening of organizational capacities, as well as the institutional and legal framework, has significant potential to contribute to the prevention, mitigation and reduction of risks to the environment and to human and animal health. This is also the case for the alternatives to chemical pesticides that were successfully tested through the project, whose adoption will help reduce the risks posed by pesticides to human health (both pesticide users and consumers of treated products) and to the environment.

VI. ANNEX

Uploaded Document

Document Category	Title
M and E Document	GEFID4641_Tracking Tool_TE_FAO_Cameroon
Document Category	Title
M and E Document	GEFID4641_TE_FAO_Cameroon