



Mid-term review of the project “Reversing Desertification Process in Susceptible Areas of Brazil: Sustainable Agroforestry Practices and Biodiversity Conservation (REDESER)”

GCP/BRA/085/GFF

GEF ID: 5324

FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS (FAO)- Brasil
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Executive summary

Introduction

1. This document presents the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the mid-term evaluation (MTR) of the project “Reversing the Desertification Process in Susceptible Areas of Brazil: Sustainable Agroforestry Practices and Biodiversity Conservation” (FAO code: GCP/BRA/085 /GFF and GEF ID: 5324), hereinafter called REDESER.
2. REDESER was submitted to the Global Environment Facility (GEF) by the Brazilian government, with support from the United Nations Food and Agriculture Agency (FAO), in 2013. It was approved by the GEF in 2016, signed by Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC) at the end of 2017 and came into operation in 2018. Despite having already undergone three extensions at no cost, the project is now halfway through.
3. The project is an initiative of the Brazilian Ministry of Environment and Climate Change (MMA), the main national counterpart in partnership with the GEF, to slow down and reverse the process of degradation and desertification that mainly affects the northeast region of Brazil. Despite being home to the second largest population and third largest area in the country, the Northeast suffers from many socio-environmental problems, hunger and poverty.
4. Through interventions in key areas aligned with former federal government projects, REDESER aims to restore degraded areas and implement sustainable forest management (MFS), generating essential ecosystem services for reducing poverty and environmental benefits that will help reduce areas susceptible to desertification (ASD). However, the project was notable for delays and low delivery in more than 5 years of operation.
5. This MTR was conducted between May and August 2023 with the aim of identifying and understanding the successes and difficulties that occurred with the REDESER project to: (i) support a decision on its continuity and, especially, (ii) to help other projects in the FAO's global portfolio financed by the GEF to avoid the delays and low delivery recorded in this project.
6. The methodology recommended by FAO for MTR was used; it is based on a participatory and transparent approach that involves various stakeholders throughout the process. The main tool used involves a series of guiding questions for each of the six standard evaluation criteria: relevance; efficiency; efficacy; sustainability; factors affecting progress; and transversal priorities.
7. The work encompassed several phases and included: initial project review and analysis of interested parties, reading of documents, interviews with those involved in the project, data

triangulation, construction of the Theory of Change (ToC), and analyses. In view of the lack of significant results, and to save time, it was decided not to carry out field visits.

Main findings

8. **Finding 1:** The project concept remains relevant and aligned with the priorities and strategies of FAO and GEF, despite having been conceived in 2013. The relevance is due to the fact that people and habitats (in the areas of the project) are in a greater vulnerable situation today than they were ten years ago. However, the project requires adjustments to be able to deliver the results agreed with the GEF in the current reality.
9. **Finding 2:** The project constitutes an opportunity to provide local governments with awareness and training on the importance of sustainability, combating desertification through the implementation of best practices in Integrated Natural Resources Management and Sustainable Forest Management, of the SDGs and cross-cutting issues (gender, youth, etc.).
10. **Finding 3:** Over a period of time, especially during the government of Mr. Jair Bolsonaro (2019-2022), support for the project declined. Nevertheless, there is once again a favorable environment to implement the project with an emphasis on combating land degradation, desertification and mitigating the effects of drought, in addition to strengthening policies related to combating poverty, protecting the environment, widen social participation, with more accountability and transparency.
11. **Finding 4:** External and internal factors affected and delayed the project which, with few results delivered, had difficulty in gaining traction and support. The results achieved with the Letters of Agreement, the main instrument for implementing the actions, are still preliminary and represent little progress towards the results agreed with the GEF.
12. **Finding 5:** Some aspects described in ProDoc were not observed satisfactorily during the implementation: the project followed the tables and activities of the results framework but lacked understanding and including the socioeconomic aspects mentioned in ProDoc, as well as incorporating the essence of the policies of the GEF. Several mandatory GEF (and FAO) policies were ignored - such as gender, indigenous peoples and youth, creation and functioning of governance structures for decision-making (Project Steering Committee and Project Management Committee) - which reduced the project's ability to generate positive and broad impacts.
13. **Finding 6:** As indicated in PIR 2021, the project had spent almost US\$275 thousand (7% of the total) and the only results registered thus far were 3 PIRs. By March 2023, recorded expenditure reached almost USD 780 thousand (almost 20% of the budget) with few results recorded. However, there is no clarity in the financial data presented or in the results obtained so far. There are two Letters of Agreement in force and another one was signed in

June 2023, as exclusive mechanisms for implementing activities in the selected territories. Actual results cannot be evaluated yet.

14. **Finding 7: ProDoc** does not present a clear exit or sustainability strategy that can be implemented in the short term. However, the project, despite the delays and because it is still in an early stage, may be able to develop an exit strategy - if it starts working on it soon.
15. **Finding 8:** The project has faced, and continues to face, a series of risks, mainly economic/financial, environmental and social, in addition to changes in government structures and management. However, in the PIRs presented, such risks were minimized (understated), in addition to the project not having a monitoring and mitigation system for them.
16. **Finding 9:** The project has not yet obtained results, lessons or experiences that lead to replication or expansion because the replication strategy presented in ProDoc requires a combination of (i) strengthening governance, (ii) communication strategy with (iii) quick and convincing results – all not yet robustly displayed by the project.
17. **Finding 10:** The lack of clarity about the project proposal contributed to the delays encountered. During the MTR, a lack of clarity beyond the project objective (strategies, actions in the field, expected results) was recorded among the majority of actors interviewed. For example, some stakeholders felt there was a "lack of identity", reflected in several proposed changes to the project that never came to effect.
18. **Finding 11:** The political and institutional environment between 2016 and 2022 was not conducive, but it was not the only cause of delays in project development. There is no evidence that an ongoing relationship with the partners existed.
19. **Finding 12:** Project implementation was poorly managed, which was partly due to a lack of clarity in the roles and responsibilities between FAO Brazil and MMA as implementing agencies and partners (there are differences between what was agreed with the Brazilian government and PRODOC). Both entities partially fulfilled their roles and responsibilities in project implementation, coordination and administration, neglecting project governance. This was worsened by the country's institutional and political situation between 2016 and 2022.
20. **Finding 13:** FAO's role as implementing agency required improvement in the technical support offered to partners, to maintain the level of recognition for which the agency is acknowledged.
21. **Finding 14:** Delays were detrimental to the project. Between approval by the GEF in 2016 and today, partners have changed their priorities or ceased to exist, consequently the

prospected and planned resources are no longer available US\$16 million of co-financing that was estimated in 2013 is yet to be materialized.

22. **Finding 15:** Historically the project was treated as an exclusive partnership between FAO and MMA. Other actors did not have an official space for participation, nor was their involvement achieved.
23. **Finding 16:** The lack of communication in general (internal and external) is one of the weaknesses of the project that contributed to its lack of visibility and difficulty in generating greater interest from new and old partners.
24. **Finding 17:** Despite what is established in the GEF standards, the project does not have an implemented M&E system and allocated resources, being limited solely to the production of annual reports (PIRs) and eventual progress reports (PPR).
25. **Finding 18:** The emphasis given to social aspects such as gender, inequality, vulnerable population (young people, elderly, etc.) in the project strategy, contained in ProDoc, is not reflected in the results structure, nor in the information collected in the interviews and nor in the progress recorded to date.
26. **Finding 19:** There is no clarity regarding the direct or indirect participation of indigenous peoples and afro-descendant communities, known as quilombolas, in the project's actions. Despite being established in the Project Environmental and Social (E&S) Screening Checklist, signed by the LTO on May 11, 2016, a diagnosis of the presence of indigenous peoples/traditional communities was not carried out in the first year of the project.

Conclusions

Based on the findings and analysis, this MTR reached the following conclusions:

27. **Conclusion 1: Relevance.** The project remains aligned with Brazilian government priorities, such as the National Policy to Combat Desertification (of July 30, 2015), and international FAO and GEF priorities, as well as various conventions, agreements and multilateral strategies such as the UN-FCCC, UNCCD, CBD, Agenda 2030, etc. However, as it has been more than 10 years since the concept was created, the project requires some adjustments to be implemented within the available timeframe.
28. **Conclusion 2: Relevance.** Despite several political and economic setbacks faced by Redeser since its approval by the GEF in 2016, in 2023 there is a favorable situation for the project politically, economically and socially. The current administration of Mr. Luis Lula da Silva (2023 - present) recreated fundamental instances for the success of Redeser (such as the DCDE/MMA, the MDA and the return of the SFB to the MMA) as well as policies with great

potential for synergy , such as combating poverty and climate change. However, to take advantage of this potential, the project needs to reinforce (i) its social dimensions (cross-cutting issues), (ii) adaptation to climate change, (iii) prevention and reversal of land degradation and desertification processes, and (iv) implement an effective communication policy.

29. **Conclusion 3: Effectiveness.** Due to successive delays, the execution of the project has been unsatisfactory without having achieved any relevant results agreed with the GEF. Therefore, it is not possible to assess the quality of the results or the existence of beneficiaries.
30. **Conclusion 4: Effectiveness.** The assessment of project effectiveness in this MTR was hampered by inconsistencies in the PIRs and PPRs (content, regularity, language). In the case of the PIRs, it was observed that the cumulative progress of the results was satisfactory, although there were unsatisfactory ratings and no evidence of real project progress. The PIRs also did not adopt a neutral stance and tended to overvalue project activities.
31. **Conclusion 5: Efficiency.** The project has been implemented in an inefficient manner. Almost 20% of the budget transferred by the GEF has already been spent, but without showing significant results. This level of delivery made it impossible to assess the project's synergies and complementarities.
32. **Conclusion 6: Efficiency.** The financial data presented are not clear to those outside the organization. The spreadsheets available leave room for different interpretations and do not specify the type of expenditure or the currency in question.
33. **Conclusion 7: Sustainability.** It will be difficult for the project to implement an exit strategy that allows for sustainability after project closure. The ProDoc strategy requires time and a lot of coordination between partners (governance), which is just one of the risks identified. The other risks are: social (pressure from land grabbers, agribusiness and new actors, non-adherence of beneficiaries and project counterparties to the practices recommended and encouraged by the Project); financial & economic (lack of resources and delay in developing value chains); environmental (climate change and acceleration of degradation and desertification).
34. **Conclusion 8: Sustainability.** The project has not yet obtained results, lessons or experiences that allow for replication or expansion. This lack of results compromises the proposed replication strategy, creating a negative spiral.
35. **Conclusion 9: Factors affecting performance.** Although the project has a coherent causal logic, there is no clarity on how implementation will take place on the ground with annual strategies and actions, especially in view of the changes in the original work areas. In terms of project design, it mixes ambitious results (such as the area to be recovered) with superficial results (such as the number of people trained).

36. **Conclusion 10: Factors affecting performance.** There is no evidence of an ongoing relationship with partners. No governance or communication strategies were found that would assist dialogue with interested parties or beneficiaries.
37. **Conclusion 11: Factors affecting performance.** FAO Brazil partially fulfilled its technical and administrative functions and responsibilities in the project. Although, on the one hand, the decision to assume the oversight function was well received by several interviewees, on the other hand, the decision to leave the dialogue with partners in the hands of the MMA was surprising because it did not help to overcome the constant exchanges of priority in the ministry and national director of the project. Supervision and support for partners were low, even more so in a project that is based on Letters of Agreement and in which FAO maintains a technical role to guarantee the quality of results. Some interviewees complained about the organization's bureaucracy and response times, which was attributed in part to the small size of the project team and in part to FAO's culture of requiring Rome's approval of some letters of agreement and contracts. This MTR, for example, was affected by the bureaucracy of FAO Brazil.
38. **Conclusion 12: Factors affecting progress.** The support offered by FAO in the implementation role could have been better. The interviews showed that the responsible regional officials had portfolios with an excessive number of projects and that some technicians at headquarters are disconnected from both national realities and practical agricultural issues.
39. **Conclusion 13: Factors affecting progress.** The implementation of the project that requires substantial financing has not yet started. Co-financing to date has been 1.23%. However, this gap was not mentioned as an obstacle in the PIRs nor by the project team during the interview.
40. **Conclusion 14: Factors affecting progress.** The project ignored the importance of an M&E system and internal and external communication. There is no M&E material to be evaluated. It was clear that these elements impact the project: there is no monitoring, evaluation, learning, or dissemination of knowledge – which contributed to the unsatisfactory PIRs. This MTR did not find a single trip report and only had access to two meeting minutes.
41. **Conclusion 15: Cross-cutting priorities.** Although the project incorporates gender and minority groups in ProDoc, these themes have little space in the activities and products and it was not possible to demonstrate that they are a priority for the project team. The explanation received was that in GEF 5 these topics were not mandatory. There is room for progress, in line with GEF and FAO policies on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples (both of which are mandatory for the project).
42. **Conclusion 16: Cross-cutting priorities.** No evidence was found that the project met the condition for approval of confirming the non-existence of indigenous peoples or quilombola

communities of African descent. Environmental impacts related to irrigation and water use were ignored in the safeguards assessment.

Recommendations

43. This MTR developed the following recommendations to improve the implementation and impact of the project.

For FAO (UC FAO-GEF, RLC and Brazil)

44. **Recommendation 1:** Take advantage of the favorable context of the current government to accelerate the implementation of the project in conjunction with the MMA. The project needs to reinforce (i) its social dimensions (cross-cutting issues), to create elements of connection with the current situation, (ii) deepen the aspects related to land degradation and combating desertification, associating them with the effects of drought and emergency climate; and (iii) and make itself known beyond MMA.
45. **Recommendation 2:** FAO should be actively involved in seeking co-financing for the project. Suggestion: negotiate with the MMA how FAO can collaborate in this process.
46. **Recommendation 3:** Review internal administrative/operational routines and processes to increase project agility. Analyze how FAO can respond more quickly to partners' demands. Suggestion: (i) establish an internal system for monitoring demands, (ii) establish deadlines for response, (iii) make them public, (iv) adequately train the project's main stakeholders in administrative, operational, technical and social skills necessary for project implementation and (v) ensuring a more robust team to assist in technical implementation by the MMA. If it is impossible to avoid delays, try to lower the level of expectations with a real vision of the organization, its deadlines and restrictions.
47. **Recommendation 4:** Reinforce among the entire team that gender, youth and indigenous peoples/traditional communities are not only a priority for the GEF, but for FAO as well. These themes must be incorporated into everyday life and not considered an exception. Suggestion: (i) insert these components as indicators in the process products, whenever possible; (ii) seek to integrate women into project teams.
48. **Recommendation 5:** FAO should improve the supervision and assistance provided to projects and country offices. FAO is recognized for its seriousness and technical rigor, however, if technical support is reduced, the organization will lose one of its great comparative advantages. Suggestion: (i) reduce the number of projects per LTO, FLO, etc. so that they can provide more in-depth and quality monitoring; (ii) promote regular dialogues and exchanges of knowledge with the projects/country office; (iii) seek to encourage staff from headquarters and regional centers to visit projects in countries, and not just the country office.

For actors related to implementation (FAO Brazil - including PMU - MMA)

49. **Recommendation 6:** Develop and implement M&E methodologies and a communications policy immediately. The M&A system must necessarily include cross-cutting risks and policies. The M&E system will offer subsidies for updating and monitoring project implementation. The communication policy will help disseminate M&A and must consider internal and external audiences, technical personnel and decision makers.
50. **Recommendation 7:** It is imperative to carry out a detailed analysis of project progress, pending activities as agreed with the GEF, current context and progress, and results framework indicators and targets in order to update the strategy implementation depending on available resources, deadlines and the country's priorities. The proposed update must be consensual and approved by the Project Steering Committee. This will allow for better project management that promotes the achievement of the proposed results and the fulfillment of commitments to the donor and society (accountability). One suggestion is to organize an internal project adjustment event to discuss and/or present the next steps (updating the risk matrix, execution strategies, pending issues, communication strategy, M&A system, quality of reports, treatment of cross-cutting themes).
51. **Recommendation 8:** The project should leave aside the sequential implementation strategy, with one step after the other (which PRODOC called single track) and adopt an implementation strategy with multiple dimensions. This will allow to accelerate results and optimize the remaining time (do more with less). A practical suggestion in this regard is to immediately begin dialogue with value chains.
52. **Recommendation 9:** The project needs to immediately develop a governance strategy based on the governance structures proposed in ProDoc and approved by the GEF. FAO Brazil and MMA will not be able to implement the project alone, hence the importance of partners. The strategy should promote opportunities for participation, balance between partners and the generation of a feeling of belonging and shared responsibility. Responsibility for partners cannot fall solely on the MMA. Suggestion: the PMU to develop a calendar of conversations and visits.
53. **Recommendation 10:** It is important to develop a feasible and clear exit strategy to ensure sustainability after the end of the project. The current exit strategy requires more time to mature than the total duration of the project. Suggestion: (i) conversations about the exit strategy can be initiated with the entities that signed Letters of Agreement to assess what their suggestion is for this problem, (ii) the sustainability strategy should include efforts: in training and assistance technique; in the creation of channels for the flow of production; in the development of value chains for the commercialization of products arising from the project's initiatives; in choosing promising and receptive practices; and encouraging governments to create countercyclical policies to prevent a few years of recession /economic crisis from ruining the entire legacy of the project.

54. **Recommendation 11:** Improve the process of writing progress reports (PPR) and implementation reports (PIR). It is important to ensure the correct periodicity, neutrality and adequate completion. Suggestion: use the inputs from the M&E system and ensure that reports are thoroughly reviewed (by an M&E professional) to ensure that there are no inconsistencies or missing information and that reports are submitted on time.
55. **Recommendation 12:** Communication must be two-way: partners must have autonomy and freedom to consult the PMU for assistance and supervision in the activities to be developed (especially within the scope of Letters of Agreement) and the PMU must be able to contact them when deemed necessary. Partners must also be guaranteed the creation of an environment that conveys the feeling of being a participant in the project and not a guest. All communication material must always reference the GEF.

Final recommendations

56. The recommendation of this MTR is to extend the project until the end of 2025, if there is interest in continuing on the part of the Brazilian government and FAO Brazil. The continuation of the project until the end of 2025 must be conditioned on: approval of a progress assessment, to be carried out at the end of 2024, by the RLC and UC FAO-GEF to measure:
- Level and quality of results obtained;
 - Leveraged resources and implementation strategy;
 - Integration of transversal policies;
 - Functionality of the M&A system;
 - Results of the communication policy;
 - Number of beneficiaries;
 - FAO Brazil's role as implementer;
 - Role of the RLC and FAO Rome office.
57. This MTR suggests revisiting and summarizing the co-funding letters as they were signed (there are explicit actions, but they also indicate that they are "synergies"). As they are "old" commitments, they must be reviewed and the impact they may have on the project scope must be analyzed. And, of course, for this new stage of the project, they must be monitored more closely.
58. The audit, workshop and final evaluation, already foreseen by the project, must be planned to take place within the extension period (until December 2025).
59. The reasoning behind this recommendation is that the entire project must be closed within the scope of the current government (2023-2026) without the possibility of anything remaining for the next government and risking possible changes in ideology/policy.

GEF classification table

GEF criteria/sub-criteria	Classification ¹	Brief Comments
A. STRATEGIC RELEVANCE		
MU		
A1. Overall strategic relevance	MU	Project presents a concept that is still relevant to national needs, aligned with strategic priorities of the GEF and FAO. Despite its relevance, in five years the project is still not known; accumulates delays; it failed to deliver results to the beneficiaries, and only managed to mobilize one of the original partners.
A1.1. Alignment with GEF and FAO strategic priorities	MS	Despite being conceived in 2013 and the strategic milestones of the GEF and FAO having already changed, the project is still aligned with current priorities.
A1.2. Relevance to national, regional and global priorities and beneficiary needs.	MS	In 2023, the project became relevant again to national priorities, but spent years with low relevance for the federal government. Project needs updating not only because it was written in 2013, but because it was guided by PAN Brasil 2005.
A1.3. Complementarity with other ongoing interventions	HU	Project did not achieve significant complementarity with other interventions. It only managed to mobilize two civil society partners and there were difficulties in the relationship between MMA and FAO.
B. EFFECTIVENESS		
U		
B1. Overall assessment of project results	U	The level of results is lower than expected and there were major deficiencies. In five years, the project was unable to deliver any forest recovery or management results, ignoring important aspects for the GEF.
B1.1 Delivery of project products	U	The only deliverables were progress reports. The other products received by the project, resulting from the Letters of Agreement, are subsidies for the products agreed with the GEF.

¹Check the qualification system at the end of this section.

B1.2 Progress towards project outcomes and objectives	U	The progress recorded was insignificant and reflects project delays, the lack of an M&E, governance and communication system.
- Component 1:	U	The project was unable to start the IMNR process, despite having already carried out a diagnosis of the situation and identified some good practices.
- Component 2:	U	Implementation of the SFM has not started, although diagnosis of target areas has been carried out
- Component 3:	U	The project was unable to begin the restoration process nor was it able to resolve the issue of nurseries and seedlings. The app developed to support decision making will be useful in the future, but it goes beyond the rest of the project.
- Component 4:	HU	Project did not initiate a training process or a communication policy for the partners and technicians involved
- Component 5:	U	Project identified potential partners, but the process did not move forward. The consultancy contract signed with ERM is not robustly aligned with the project.
- Overall assessment of progress towards project outcomes and objectives	MU	There were significant deficiencies caused by internal and external factors (such as impeachment, changes in political guidelines and government structures, Covid-19 pandemic, etc.) and internal factors (example: the 7 changes of national director of the project between 2018 and 2023; successive vacancies in the project team at FAO) that compromised the results. However, intermediate results begin to emerge to move towards the process objectives.
C. EFFICIENCY	HU	
C1. Efficiency ²	HU	The main aspects here are: the delay in delivering the expected results (which have not yet appeared); and the fact that the project had spent more than US\$500 thousand by PIR 2022 without achieving the expected results.
D. SUSTAINABILITY OF PROJECT RESULTS	Moderately unlikely	

²Includes cost-efficiency and punctuality.

D1. General probability of sustainability risks	MU	The multifaceted sustainability strategy presented in ProDoc is not detailed in the products and is time-consuming. The project faces an immediate financial risk, as it only has 20% of the necessary resources.
D1.1. Financial risks	U	It is the most immediate risk of the project. The amount of co-financing in kind already materialized (US\$194 thousand ³) is insignificant compared to what is needed (only 1.23% of the expected total).
D1.2. Sociopolitical risks	MP	There are significant risks to the sustainability of the project involving actors not foreseen in ProDoc and also with land grabbers and/or agribusiness representatives.
D1.3. Institutional and governance risks	U	This is the risk that the project experienced, and still experiences, as there is a lack of clear measures to reverse this scenario, such as governance and communication strategies.
D1.4. Environmental risks	MP	The risk exists and is significant. It tends to increase as the project takes longer to start activities, which leads to the abandonment of properties, increased degradation and desertification.
D2. Acceleration and playback	U	The project has nothing to use for acceleration and reproduction. Furthermore, the proposed reproduction strategy requires an active communication strategy.
E. FACTORS AFFECTING INCOME		HU
E1. Project concept and maturity	MU	Although the causal logic is clear, the starting points are not. There is a lack of clarity that makes it difficult to understand the project implementation. The project has still not managed to generate expected results five years after its beginning. The project concept was successful in addressing gender issues in ProDoc, but failed to do so in the results framework. The youth theme is covered with less emphasis in ProDoc and only appears in one product. There was little social participation before and during the project. The deadlines needed to carry out the planned activities were underestimated.

³According to PIR 2022

E2. Quality of project implementation	HU	Project faces great difficulties in implementation (due to internal and external problems, which are analyzed in section 4). It has 5 years and 20% of the GEF transfer has already been used without any significant results. The causes of problems in implementation cannot all be attributed to the MMA: there is co-responsibility of FAO.
E2.1 Quality of project implementation by FAO	U	FAO received criticism about the quality of implementation, especially due to aspects related to bureaucracy and delays in official responses and positions. The team is smaller than proposed in ProDoc and for a long time it was understaffed. The project did not develop an M&E system to monitor project implementation.
E2.1 Project supervision (PSC, project working group, etc.)	U	Project supervision is flawed. There was no CDP meeting in 2018 nor a launch workshop. The only CDP meeting took place in June 2021 and did not include the participation of the Focal Point for the GEF in the Brazilian government. Only a draft of the FAO – MMA meeting was found, in March 2022. There are no working groups or thematic organizations. No field trip reports to monitor implementation nor minutes of meetings with partners were presented.
E3. Quality of project execution.	HU	To date, the level of results achieved is insignificant and there have been serious failures. However, evidence not present in the PIR 2022, such as interviews and products delivered under the letter according to the APNE, represent results in the direction of the agreed results.
E3.1 Project execution and management (PMU and executing partner performance, administration, staffing, etc.)	U	Project administration was conducted in a pragmatic manner with the aim of keeping the project alive, basically involving the FAO and at times the MMA. There is room to improve both execution and management. Minimum participation from partners, only via Letters of Agreement.
E4. Financial management and co-financing	HU	The information presented about the project budget is not clear. According to the PIR 2022, the level of co-financing in kind obtained was negligible (1.23%). No financial contributions were recorded.

E5. Project partnerships and stakeholder engagement	U	The project operates with Letters of Agreement and this is limited to the participation of external actors. No evidence was found of other synergies and collaborations with external agents.
E6. Communication, knowledge management and knowledge products	HU	There is no communication strategy. There is no knowledge management or products. The project presents little transparency, including this MTR.
E7. Overall quality of M&E	HU	The project has so far not considered a relevant M&E system. Partners complain about the lack of support.
E7.1 M&E design	HU	The project has not presented an M&A concept to date.
E7.2 M&E plan implementation (including financial and human resources)	HU	The technical team declared that now with a new coordinator they will develop an M&A system
E8. Overall assessment of factors affecting performance	HU	The level of results achieved is insignificant AND there were very serious failures, such as the absence of an M&A system, communication strategy and knowledge management.
F. CROSS-CUTTING CONCERNS	HU	
F1. Gender and other equity dimensions	U	ProDoc addresses gender, youth and generational issues. These themes have little space in the results matrix, but are not considered priorities by the project team.

F2. Human rights issues	HU	It was not addressed in ProDoc, nor in the implementation, nor mentioned in the interviews. It is not on the project's radar.
F2. Environmental and social safeguards	HU	The Project Environmental and Social (E&S) Screening Checklist indicated that the project was approved on the condition that an assessment of the presence of Indigenous Peoples would be conducted. However, this assessment was not done until the MTR The team that carried out the social and environmental safeguards analysis ignored (i) the issue of water use and (ii) irrigation by the project, and (iii) the need for effective governance mechanisms.
Overall project rating	U	

Ratings	Description
Highly satisfactory (HS)	The level of performance achieved clearly exceeds expectations or there were no failures
Satisfactory (S)	The level of results achieved is in line with expectations or there were no failures or there were minimal failures.
Moderately satisfactory (MS)	The level of performance achieved is more or less as expected or the deficiencies have been moderated
Moderately unsatisfactory (MI)	In some way, the level of results achieved is lower than expected or there were significant deficiencies.
Unsatisfactory (U)	The level of results achieved is substantially lower than expected or there were major deficiencies
Highly unsatisfactory (HU)	The level of results achieved is insignificant or there were very serious failures
Impossible to evaluate (IE)	The available information does not allow an assessment of the level of results achieved.